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INTRODUCTION 
 
The creation of a bankruptcy remote “special purpose entity” or 
“special purpose vehicle,” (hereinafter “SPE”) has been a longstanding 
valuable securitization tool, protecting lenders from the financial risks of 
large commercial borrowers. Corporations generally set up a subsidiary 
in the form of a SPE to separate the ownership of an asset from the risk 
associated with its financing. A SPE is generally designed to be 
“bankruptcy remote” so that it is difficult for a majority of board 
members or managing members of a business to put it into bankruptcy.1 
Recent case law casts doubt as to whether the SPE securitization model 
is still effective. This doubt arises from the recent Chapter 11 case of In 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. In describing a bankruptcy remote entity, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board has explained: “the special-purpose corporation is designed to make remote the 
possibility that it would enter bankruptcy, either by itself or by substantive 
consolidation into a bankruptcy of its parent should that occur. For example, its charter 
forbids it from undertaking any other business or incurring any liabilities, so that there 
can be no creditors to petition to place it in bankruptcy. Furthermore, its dedication to a 
single purpose is intended to make it extremely unlikely, even if it somehow entered 
bankruptcy, that a receiver under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code could reclaim the 
transferred assets because it has no other assets to substitute for the transferred assets.” 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140, App. A, ¶83(c). 
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re General Growth Properties (“GGP”), in which a voluntary 
bankruptcy petition was filed by a bankruptcy remote SPE.2 
This Note discusses securitization through SPEs and the 
effectiveness of bankruptcy remote provisions. Part I discusses the effect 
of the SPE structure, a SPE’s characteristics, and standard bankruptcy 
remote provisions. Part I also explains why SPEs are valuable 
securitization methods and describes the risks they intend to mitigate. 
Part II discusses the potential legal challenges that may be brought 
against a SPE and the risks lenders face by participating in such a 
transaction. Part III addresses the effectiveness of Bankruptcy Remote 
Provisions against voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy filings, 
focusing on the recent GGP opinion. Part IV examines the consequences 
of the GGP decision and its predicted effect on future SPE financing. 
Finally, Part V concludes by outlining the proper protective measures a 
transferor should take in creating a SPE to ensure that the securitization 
survives potential challenges. 
 
I. SPES GENERALLY 
A. WHAT IS A SPE? 
A SPE is an independent legal entity that can be used to mitigate 
the disruption caused by a bankruptcy filing by all or some of the 
members of a corporate group.3 It is therefore an essential element of 
securitization.4 SPEs are structured so that investors are protected from 
the credit risk of the loan originator or servicer, also known as the 
“sponsor” or “transferor.”5 Essentially, a lender may be more inclined to 
provide a secured loan to an independent entity rather than to a complex 
corporate group with several creditors. Generally, a SPE is created when 
the transferor transfers ownership of some income producing assets, 
such as equity generating income or mortgages generating payments, to 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
 3. See Stuart M. Saft, Refinancing a Discounted Indebtedness: Special Purpose 
Entities, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE WORKOUTS § 7:33 (3d ed.) (2010). 
 4. CHARLES R. GIBBS ET AL., MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 
LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 7:3 (2010). 
 5. Marcia L. Goldstein et. al., General Growth Properties: Are Bankruptcy-
Remote Entities in Fact Bankruptcy-Remote?, 2010 AM. BANKR. INST. 187; see 
generally Sheryl A. Gussett, Bankruptcy Remote Entities in Structured Financings, 15 
MAR. AM. BANKR. INST. J. 15 (1996) (discussing means of creating the SPE and 
whether an entity can truly be bankruptcy remote). 
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a SPE.6 An SPE achieves bankruptcy remote status through governance 
provisions and restrictive covenants. Ideally, the SPE will be a newly 
created corporation, limited liability company, partnership, nonprofit, 
business trust, or limited liability partnership.7 While tax considerations 
largely determine which type of entity will be ideal, most commonly, 
SPEs are either limited partnerships or limited liability companies.8 
The effect of this structure is to separate the credit quality of the 
assets being securitized from the credit risk of any other entity involved 
in the financing.9 Isolating the assets makes the financing more 
attractive to a lender by lessening potential risk.10 This separation is 
achieved by structuring the sale of assets between the transferor and the 
SPE as a “true sale” between the parties rather than as a transfer of a 
security interest in the assets.11 After a true sale of the assets, the 
transferor is left with no legal or equitable interest in the assets.12 If the 
transferor later files for bankruptcy, the transferred assets will not be 
included as part of the transferor’s estate; and investors who are secured 
by the SPE’s assets are not at risk of losing any part of their security 
interest. 
Corporate governance provisions and restrictive covenants 
generally ensure that the SPE will be bankruptcy remote. This structure 
prevents the SPE from becoming a debtor in bankruptcy and also 
protects the SPE’s assets from the bankruptcy of a related corporate 
entity.13 Bankruptcy remote provisions are often found in the SPE’s 
charter or bylaws.14 The SPE’s corporate documents will generally 
contain restrictive provisions requiring that the SPE be limited to its 
                                                                                                                                         
 6. Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate, Special Purpose Entity 
(SPE/SPV) and Bankruptcy Remoteness, 4 LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 56:4 
(2010). 
 7. “In some states this will result in the payment of a substantial transfer tax and 
an alternative will be to use an existing entity which is restructured to meet the 
bankruptcy remoteness requirements.” Id. at § 56:29. 
 8. Id. at § 56:55. 
 9. Id. at § 56:27. 
 10. Saft, supra note 3. 
 11. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:4, :27.  
 12. See id. 
 13. Id. § 56:27. 
 14. See, e.g., Katherine D. Kale, Securitizing the Enterprise: Enterprise Liability 
and Transferred Receivables in Bankruptcy, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 311, 319 (2003). 
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stated purpose of holding the collateral assets, therefore restricting it 
from engaging in outside activities.15 
Additionally, restrictive covenants ensure the borrower’s status as a 
SPE. These covenants often prohibit the borrower from (1) engaging in 
business other than to operate the collateral; (2) owning property other 
than the collateral; (3) merging with another entity or acquiring any 
subsidiary; (4) incurring other debt (with exceptions of ordinary course 
trade payables and equipment financing); (5) co-mingling assets with 
affiliates; and (6) guaranteeing the debt of an affiliate or pledging its 
assets to secure the debt of another.16 These covenants limit the SPE’s 
powers to activities necessary to operate the structured transaction.17 
Additional activities may include things such as permitting the SPE to 
incur debt for future real estate taxes and/or additional covenants 
contained in easements and other matters of public record.18 If one 
lender wishes to secure loans on multiple properties, the SPE may be 
designed to operate all the relevant properties. However, if the borrower 
wishes to change management or sell any of the relevant properties, 
lender approval will be required.19 These limits preclude the SPE from 
engaging in operations outside the asset securitization, thus reducing the 
risk of the SPE becoming insolvent.20 
In addition, a SPE’s bankruptcy remote provisions will also 
generally require that in order to file for bankruptcy voluntarily, there 
must be unanimous consent of the SPE’s directors or partners with an 
“independent” director, partner, or managing member of the SPE (the 
“independent director requirement”).21 The independent director 
requirement prevents common directors of the SPE and the SPE’s parent 
entity from submitting a solvent SPE to bankruptcy solely for the parent 
entity’s advantage.22 The independent director is often designated by the 
lender and can presumably veto any suggestion of the SPE filing a 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52. 
 16. Michael T. Madison et. al., Impact of Bankruptcy on Real Estate Transactions, 
2 LAW OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 13:38 (2009). 
 17. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:31. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (“More than one property may be operated if the lender is securitizing loans 
on all of the properties. If the borrower wishes to sell or change management of one of 
the properties this would be a ‘defeasance,’ which requires the approval of the lender or 
may be provided for in the agreement.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:4. 
 22. Saft, supra note 3. 
232 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
voluntary bankruptcy petition.23 Therefore, the independent director 
requirement protects the lenders’ interests by shielding the SPE from 
complete control of the parent company’s board of directors. 
Rating agencies assign credit ratings for issuers of certain types of 
debt obligations and for the debt instruments themselves. These agencies 
set the requirements as to who can be considered an independent 
director. Typically, an independent director must not:  
(1) [H]ave a direct or indirect legal or beneficial interest in the 
borrower or any of its related entities; (2) be a substantial creditor, 
customer, supplier, employee, or other person that derives any of its 
purchases or revenues from the borrower or its related entities; (3) be 
a member of the immediate family of any member, manager, 
creditor, customer, supplier, employee or other person that derives 
any of its purchases or revenues from the borrower or its related 
entities; or (4) be a person or entity controlling or under common 
control of anyone referred to in items one through three.24 
B. WHY HAVE A SPE? 
SPEs are intended to address two primary issues. First, through 
their separate structure and bankruptcy remote provisions, SPEs aim to 
minimize the risk of the commercial borrower of a securitized loan 
becoming the subject of a bankruptcy case (“Borrower Bankruptcy 
Risk”).25 This includes the risk of a corporate parent or affiliate’s 
financial problems spreading to the borrower and the risk of the 
borrower itself enduring financial difficulty.26 The effectiveness of a 
SPE’s ability to reduce Borrower Bankruptcy Risk was tested by the 
court in General Growth Properties, discussed infra in Part III of this 
Note. 
Second, SPEs are intended to minimize the risk that the assets of a 
borrower will become substantively consolidated with those of a related 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. STANDARD & POOR’S LEGAL CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURED FINANCE 
TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 2004), available at www.mbaa.org%2Ffiles%2FresourceCenter 
%2FRegAB%2FRegABLegalCriteriaforStructuredFinance%28S%26P%29.pdf&ei=9f
UnT5PfEKfq0gHbxZDsAg&usg=AFQjCNGbIICKrE1Gk3Cu__pfzxHffOq8Pw&sig2=
nMqHZ6NVkRBBrlZvgjkNgA. 
 24. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:33. 
 25. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:3. 
 26. Id. 
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corporate entity (“Substantive Consolidation Risk”).27 Loan issuers and 
rating agencies often insist that single borrowers or property specific 
groups set up a SPE in order to securitize a loan to protect the creditors 
from the risk of the SPE being substantively consolidated.28 If the 
bankruptcy filings of a SPE and related entity are substantively 
consolidated by the bankruptcy court, the assets and liabilities of the 
different entities will be consolidated and dealt with as if they were a 
single entity that held all the assets and incurred all the liabilities.29 The 
process of substantively consolidating the assets and liabilities of the 
SPE with the related entity will delay any quick resolution to the 
bankruptcy case, and may also prevent the lender from realizing on its 
collateral.30 This is because even if the SPE is not itself the subject of a 
bankruptcy filing, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to authorize a 
temporary restraining order or injunction that will prevent any creditor 
from exercising its collection or enforcement efforts.31 Further, section 
362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay to prevent 
the SPE and its creditors from foreclosing on assets of the debtor.32 
Substantive Consolidation Risk is discussed infra in Part II of this Note. 
Bankruptcy remote structures also protect creditors if the SPE does, 
in fact, file for bankruptcy through certain procedural advantages. 
Section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, added as part of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, provides for lifting of the automatic 
stay in a “single asset real estate” case unless within 90 days of the filing 
of bankruptcy the debtor has either filed a reorganization plan that has a 
reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a reasonable time, or 
has commenced monthly payments of post-petition interest to the 
mortgagee at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor’s 
interest in the real estate.33 However, if the SPE has included covenants 
                                                                                                                                         
 27. Id. 
 28. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:35. 
 29. Id. 
 30. GIBBS ET AL., supra note 4, § 7:3. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (2006). 
 33. In the 1994 amendments, Congress limited the applicability of expedited relief 
from a stay by defining four components of “single asset real estate”: (1) a single 
property or project; (2) that generates substantially all of the debtor’s gross income; (3) 
on which the debtor conducts no substantial business aside from operating the real 
property; and (4) having aggregate non-contingent, liquidated secured debts of less than 
$4 million. Steven H. Felderstein & Joan S. Huh, Single Asset Real Estate Cases, 30th 
Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 905 PLI/COMM 37 (citing 
11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (1994)). 
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to preserve the SPE as a single asset, single purpose borrower, the SPE 
may be subject to accelerated procedures for purposes of lifting the stay, 
giving an advantage to the secured lender.34 Courts may also be more 
willing to enforce stay waivers in pre-petition workout agreements 
involving single asset debtors.35 
 
II. CHALLENGES TO THE SPE STRUCTURE AND LENDER RISKS 
A. CHALLENGES TO THE SPE STRUCTURE 
1. Recharacterization: What is a “True Sale” Versus a Secured 
Loan? 
Although the structure of a SPE is designed to isolate assets, the 
legal separateness of an SPE can be challenged in bankruptcy court by 
the trustee or debtor in possession (“DIP”). Challenges to the 
separateness of the SPE’s structure are often based on the notion that the 
SPE is not in fact separate from the transferor.36 Depending on the 
precautions taken by the transferor in setting up the sale transaction 
(discussed in detail below), the court may find that instead of a true sale 
of assets, the sale transaction was a step transaction, or simply a loan, 
and therefore the assets are still part of the transferor’s estate under 
section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code.37 If the assets are deemed to be part 
of the transferor’s estate, their value will be disbursed to creditors of the 
transferor, rather than the SPE’s lenders.38 
Case law reveals a significant number of factors that bear on the 
question of whether a transaction is legally a loan or a “true sale,” and 
usually no single factor is determinative.39 State law determines whether 
a transaction is a true sale or a secured loan; and courts look to the 
parties’ intentions and the facts and circumstances of the transaction 
including the practices, objectives, and relationship between parties.40 In 
                                                                                                                                         
 34. Madison et al., supra note 16. 
 35. Id. § 13:10. 
 36. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38.  
 37. 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
 38. See id. § 541(a). 
 39. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38 (discussing risk of recharacterization of 
transaction as not a true sale).  
 40. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:38 (citing In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc., 829 
F.2d 705, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Redic v. Gary H. Watts Realty Co., 762 F.2d 
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addition to the parties’ intent, courts have focused on the extent to which 
the risks and benefits associated with ownership have been retained or 
transferred.41 Courts look to the level of recourse that the SPE has 
against the seller for repayment of the purchase price of the assets. In a 
“true sale” the buyer is taking full credit risk on the payment.42 Where 
the buyer has direct recourse to the transferor (the seller), the buyer has 
the right to collect from the seller any amount that is not paid, indicating 
the transaction is intended to be a loan rather than a true sale.43 The 
more recourse the SPE has available, the more likely it is that the 
transaction will be viewed as a loan. 
In determining whether a challenged sale transaction is a “true sale” 
or a loan, courts may also consider whether there are disproportionate 
reserves, which party controls collection on accounts, which party 
controls the sale proceeds, whether parties abided by formal accounting 
procedures, whether the buyer purchased specific assets as opposed to 
an undivided interest in a blind pool of assets, whether excise and ad 
valorem taxes have been paid by the buyer, whether the buyer has the 
right to resell the assets, and the reasonableness of the purchase price.44 
If the sale transaction is re-characterized from a true sale to a loan 
from the transferor to the SPE, or a security interest, and the transfer of 
assets was not perfected under Article 9 of the U.C.C., then the SPE 
holds the assets as an unperfected security interest, avoidable under 
section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 9-317 of the U.C.C., 
and the SPE becomes an unsecured creditor in the transferor’s pool of 
creditors.45 If the transfer was perfected, as most rating agencies require, 
the SPE’s investors would be secured creditors with a higher priority, 
meaning they are more likely to get repaid in the cascade of 
distribution.46 
In a bankruptcy of the transferor, courts have great latitude in 
determining whether the transferred assets were truly sold to the SPE, or 
if instead they are part of the transferor’s estate. Bankruptcy courts have 
                                                                                                                                         
1181, 1185-86 (4th Cir. 1985); Major’s Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 
F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Carolina Utils. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
1990). 
 41. Id. 
 42. John F. Hilson, Asset-Based Lending: A Practical Guide to Secured Financing, 
2010 PRACTISING LAW INST. § 2:5.3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45.  See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006); U.C.C. § 9-317 (2000). 
 46. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:40. 
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broad powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and have the 
ability to broadly interpret the definition of the “estate” of a debtor 
under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re LTV Steel Co., the 
court held that the debtor was entitled to use cash collateral that had 
been transferred to two SPEs of the debtor, which had been formed to 
purchase the accounts and inventory of the debtor.47 The case involved a 
loan originator that had filed for bankruptcy and challenged its own 
securitization by asserting that it had not “truly” sold all of its assets to 
a bankruptcy remote SPE.48 This assertion was made even though the 
debtor, LTV, had agreed to and benefited from the securitization.49 
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, LTV and its creditor, Abbey 
National, entered into a securitization transaction.50 LTV created a 
wholly-owned subsidiary SPE known as LTV Sales Finance Co. LTV 
then entered into an agreement with the SPE, which purported to sell all 
of LTV’s rights and interests in its accounts receivables on a continuing 
basis.51 Abbey National agreed to loan $270 million to the SPE in 
exchange for the SPE granting Abbey National a security interest in the 
receivables.52 Subsequently, LTV filed a petition in Chapter 11. The 
SPE was not in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, LTV filed a motion seeking 
an interim order permitting it to use cash collateral.53 This cash collateral 
consisted of the receivables and inventory that were owned by the 
SPE.54 LTV stated to the court that it would be forced to shut its doors 
and cease operations if it did not receive authorization to use the cash 
collateral.55 
LTV argued that despite the intent and the language of the 
securitization documents, it still owned the securitized assets.56 
However, the entire premise of a securitization facility is that the 
securitized assets have been transferred to the SPE and the assets are no 
longer LTV’s “collateral.”57 In fact, a debtor’s request to “use” that 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 48. See id. at 279-82. 
 49. See id. at 285. 
 50. Id. at 280. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:39. 
 57. Id. 
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collateral presupposes that the debtor still owns such assets.58 After an 
emergency hearing, the bankruptcy court permitted LTV to use the 
securitized assets on an interim basis, and granted the SPE a senior lien 
in inventory and receivables generated post-petition by LTV.59 
The court explained that the “Debtor has at least some equitable 
interest in the inventory and accounts that were a product of its labor, 
and that this interest is property of the Debtor’s estate . . . sufficient to 
support the entry of the interim cash collateral order.”60 The court was 
satisfied that without entry of the interim order, LTV would have been 
immediately forced to cease its business operations.61 Such an 
occurrence would have eliminated LTV’s chance to reorganize its 
business and would have had dire consequences for LTV’s employees, 
customers, and creditors. Considering the potential effect of ending the 
debtor’s business, the court held that the general equities of the situation 
“highly favored the debtor.”62 This decision has been heavily criticized 
as an insufficient basis for the court’s determination that the debtor 
retained any interest in the transferred property, as the court failed to 
consider the relevant facts or legal principles applicable to such a 
determination.63 Ironically, in a later Stipulation and Order by the court 
which resolved the parties’ dispute, the court ordered that the transfers at 
issue constituted “true sales.”64 
LTV Steel Co. was factually unusual in that the transferor 
challenged its own securitization, which is generally inconsistent with a 
transferor’s interests.65 Nonetheless, the court’s approach to the true sale 
issue is significant. In LTV Steel Co., the court was influenced by the 
fact that use of the cash collateral was essential to the survival of the 
business and jobs of its thousands of employees.66 This shows the 
importance of DIP financing as an exit strategy in securitization.67 
                                                                                                                                         
 58. Id. 
 59. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281. 
 60. Id. at 285. 
 61. Id. at 284. 
 62. Id. at 286. 
 63. Hilson, supra note 42, § 2:5.3 n.31. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future 
of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1698 (2004). 
 66. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 284. 
 67. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:39. 
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Further, where a debtor retains substantial risk in asset securitization, the 
court may recharacterize the transaction as a secured loan.68 
2. Substantive Consolidation 
Substantive consolidation is the pooling of the assets and liabilities 
of technically distinct corporate entities.69 For purposes of distribution in 
bankruptcy, substantive consolidation treats multiple entities as if they 
were one.70 If the transferor files for bankruptcy, the transferor’s 
creditors may argue for substantive consolidation. The transferor’s 
creditors want the estate to be as valuable as possible to maximize their 
recovery.71 Substantive consolidation of the SPE and transferor 
increases the amount of assets to be divided up among the transferor’s 
creditors.72 Substantive consolidation is likely to occur where the debtor 
makes payments out of the ordinary course of business, pledges 
additional or substitute collateral (with value in excess of the released 
collateral) or if the borrower transfers collections to the SPE.73 
In In re Augie/Restivo Baking Company, Ltd., the Second Circuit 
set out what has become the widely followed standard for when 
substantive consolidation is appropriate.74 The court identified two 
critical concerns that should be addressed: (1) “whether creditors dealt 
with the entities as a single economic unit and ‘did not rely on their 
separate identity in extending credit’” 75 and (2) “whether the affairs of 
the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all 
creditors.”76 The Second Circuit has since further developed this 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. T. Randall Wright, Bankruptcy Issues in Partnership and Limited Liability 
Company Cases, SR056 ALI-ABA 1201 (2010). 
 69. See generally 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 3D § 21:3 (2008). 
 70. William L. Norton, Jr., Joint Administration, Procedural Consolidation, and 
Substantive Consolidation of Cases (Code § 302(b)), 2 NORTON, supra note 69, § 21:3. 
 71.  See generally 2 NORTON, supra note 69, § 21:3 (discussing substantive 
consolidation). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:37. 
 74. Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo 
Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In re Raymond Professional 
Group, Inc., 438 B.R. 130, 138 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re The Lodge at Big Sky, 
LLC, 454 B.R. 138, 142 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011); In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 
820, 829 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). 
 75. Id. at 518 (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 1100-33). 
 76. Id. at 518. 
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standard to include consideration of (1) whether the related entities have 
assumed each other’s contractual obligation; (2) whether there is a 
sharing of overhead, management, accounting, and other related 
expenses between the entities; (3) the existence of intercompany loan 
guarantees; (4) a failure to respect corporate formalities when shifting 
funds between entities; (5) inadequate capitalization of a subsidiary; (6) 
a parent corporation owning all or a majority of the subsidiary’s capital 
stock; and (7) whether the related entities have common directors, 
officers, and business locations.77 These factors illustrate the importance 
of separateness in a SPE asset securitization in order to ensure that the 
court will honor the independence of the SPE. 
3. Fraudulent Conveyance/Avoidable Preference 
Other potential challenges to the sale transaction include: (1) that 
the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance avoidable under section 548 of 
the Bankruptcy Code or (2) that the SPE was a creditor and the transfer 
was an avoidable preference under section 547.78 Avoidance suits can be 
detrimental to a SPE securitization because if a transfer of assets is 
avoided as a fraudulent transfer or preference, the assets will not be 
available to make timely payments to the investors.79 
A fraudulent conveyance, which is avoidable under the Bankruptcy 
Code or applicable state law, is a viable attack against a SPE when the 
purchase price paid by the borrower is less than the reasonably 
equivalent value of the assets, and when the transferor is insolvent or 
financially distressed at the time of the transfer.80 If the rating agency 
determines that there is a risk of a fraudulent conveyance, it will 
generally require a “fraudulent conveyance opinion” to the effect that 
the transfer and the related payments to the holders of the rated 
securities would not be recoverable as a fraudulent transfer under 
section 548 or applicable state law.81 In defending against a fraudulent 
conveyance action, Bankruptcy Code section 550(b) provides protection 
                                                                                                                                         
 77. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:35 (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 
Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); Committee on Bankruptcy and Corp. 
Reorganizations of the Bar of City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 
BUS. LAW. 527, 558 (1995); Malcolm S. Dorris, Problem Cases in Bankruptcy, 747 
PLI/Comm 395, 418–419 (1996)). 
 78. Id. § 56:27. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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for a good faith transferee to the extent of the value given and is 
applicable whether or not the transferee is a creditor.82 In determining 
whether the transferee acted in good faith, courts generally apply an 
objective test, which asks whether the transferee knew or reasonably 
should have known of the debtor’s insolvency or of his fraudulent 
intent.83 
A preferential transfer may also be avoided by a trustee in 
bankruptcy when a debtor made a transfer within 90 days, or for an 
insider, one year on account of antecedent debt while the debtor was 
insolvent.84 A payment is “on account of an antecedent debt” if the debt 
owed the creditor was incurred before the transfer of the debtor’s 
property was made.85 This could be a problem if the SPE’s transferor 
becomes a debtor and has made transfers to the SPE within the 
prescribed period prior to the transferor’s bankruptcy.86 Preference 
attacks are likely to occur when debt payments were made outside the 
ordinary course of business or when there was a pledge of additional 
collateral or substitute collateral having a value in excess of released 
collateral.87 If the rating agency determines that there is a preference risk 
in connection with a transfer of assets, it will generally request a 
“preference opinion” from an independent attorney to the effect that the 
payments to the holders of the rated securities would not be recoverable 
as a preference.88 
In defending against a preference action, available defenses under 
section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code include the contemporaneous 
new value exception, the ordinary course of business exception and the 
subsequent new value exception.89 Under the “contemporaneous 
                                                                                                                                         
 82. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2006). 
 83. W. Homer Drake, Jr., Property Recovered by the Trustee, BANKR. PRAC. FOR 
GEN. PRACTITIONER § 5:15 (2010). 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Tanner Family, LLC, 556 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that a payment made to terminate a lease is a payment made on account of 
antecedent debt because the obligation to pay future rent under the lease arose at the 
time the lease was signed). 
 86. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:37. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Other defenses to a preference action include: Enabling Loan Exception; 
Floating Lien Exception; Statutory Lien Exception; Domestic Support Exception; Small 
Preference Exception; and Consumer Debt Repayment Plan Exception. 11 U.S.C. § 
547(c) (2006). 
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exchange for new value exception,” the trustee may not avoid a transfer 
if: “(1) the transferee . . . extended new value to the debtor in exchange 
for the payment or transfer; (2) the exchange of payment for new value 
[was] intended by the debtor and transferee to be contemporaneous; and 
(3) the exchange [was] in fact substantially contemporaneous.”90 The 
rationale for this exception is that because new value is given, a 
contemporaneous exchange does not diminish the debtor’s estate.91 In 
determining whether the transfer was made in the ordinary course of 
business between the parties, the court applies a subjective test, 
considering factors such as the timing, amount, and manner of 
payment.92 
In order to benefit from the “new value” defense, the creditor must 
establish that it provided new value to the debtor after the preferential 
transfer, which was (1) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable 
security interest; and (2) on account of which new value the debtor did 
not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such 
creditor.93 The theory behind this exception is that, when the creditor 
who received the preferential payment subsequently extends new value, 
the creditor has essentially returned the preference to the estate, so long 
as the debtor does not pay the creditor for that new value and does not 
give the creditor a security interest in exchange for it.94 
B. LENDER RISKS IN BANKRUPTCY REMOTE STRUCTURING 
A lender’s involvement in bankruptcy remote structuring can entail 
several risks for the lender. First, the lender’s involvement in the sale 
transaction may cause it to be considered an “insider” which would 
extend the look-back period in which a DIP or trustee can avoid the 
transaction as a preference.95 Further, the bankruptcy court may invoke 
its equitable power to subordinate the lien of the secured creditor who 
interfered with the debtor’s business to the detriment of other creditors.96 
Equitable subordination is a doctrine which provides that for purposes of 
                                                                                                                                         
 90. See id. § 547(c)(1). 
 91. In re JWJ Contracting Co., Inc., 371 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 92. Drake, Jr., supra note 83, § 5:13 (citing In re First Jersey Secs., Inc., 180 F.3d 
504 (3d Cir. 1999)); In re Pillowtex Corp., 427 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010)). 
 93. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (2006). 
 94. Drake, Jr., supra note 83, § 5:13 (2010) (citing In re Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc., 
317 B.R. 423 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004)). 
 95. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(C)(v). 
 96. Madison et al., supra note 16, §§ 13:38, 12:17. 
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distribution, the bankruptcy court may, after notice and a hearing, 
subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another 
allowed claim, or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of 
another allowed interest.97 
A claim is likely to be equitably subordinated where the lender 
becomes too intimately involved in the affairs of the debtor or seeks 
otherwise to take unfair advantage of other creditors. Under these 
circumstances the court will order the lender’s claims to be subordinated 
to the claims of other creditors.98 
In other words, equitable subordination may be applied by the court 
where the lender engages in some inequitable conduct that results in 
injury to other creditors or an unfair advantage to the lender. If the 
lender designates an independent director to serve on the SPE’s board, 
the lender’s involvement might trigger lender liability consequences for 
excessive control.99 Further, if the lender is considered an insider, the 
risk of equitable subordination is more likely.100 This is because for 
inside creditors, the court uses a somewhat lower standard to establish 
inequitable conduct warranting subordination.101 
Another risk to the lender stems from the possibility of the lender’s 
designated director breaching his or her fiduciary duties to the SPE 
when the independent director acts in the best interest of the lender, but 
contrary to the best interests of the SPE. This risk was addressed by the 
court in Kingston Square, discussed infra in Part III of this Note. 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS 
As discussed earlier, bankruptcy remote provisions are generally 
part of the SPE structure to protect investors by ensuring that they get 
paid on time.102 If the transferor, or the SPE itself were to file for 
                                                                                                                                         
 97. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006). 
 98. Hilson, supra note 42, § 12:6.6. 
 99. Madison et al., supra note 16, § 13:38. 
 100. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. MascoTech, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 744 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(“[W]hen reviewing equitable subordination claims, courts impose a higher standard of 
conduct upon insiders.”); In re Herby’s Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(“[I]f the claimant is an insider, less egregious conduct may support equitable 
subordination”); In re Interstate Cigar Co., 182 B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“[C]ourt gives ‘special scrutiny’ to [an insider’s] transactions with the Debtor”). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See infra Part I.B.  
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bankruptcy, the investors would likely be at risk of not getting paid on 
time or in the full amount.103 This risk is more significant where the 
transferor has control over the SPE or its downstream affiliated 
entities.104 The SPE cannot be prohibited from voluntarily filing for 
bankruptcy, however, the independent director requirement limits this 
risk. Even if the SPE does not voluntarily file a bankruptcy petition, the 
SPE can be forced into bankruptcy by creditors forcing it to file an 
involuntary petition.105 However, rating agencies minimize the risk of 
involuntary filings by limiting the debt the SPE can incur and requiring 
prompt payment.106 
A. BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS FAILURE TO PROTECT 
AGAINST AN INVOLUNTARY PETITION 
Despite rating agencies’ preventative measures, bankruptcy remote 
SPEs can still be involuntarily forced into bankruptcy by creditors. This 
was illustrated in Kingston Square, where a SPE’s creditors forced the 
bankruptcy remote SPE into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary petition 
against it.107 In Kingston Square, the bankruptcy court appointed a 
trustee to administer the estates of various limited partnership and 
corporate debtors in connection with two failed commercial real estate 
securitization transactions.108 In each instance, the debtors used 
bankruptcy remote provisions coupled with mortgage-backed 
securitization.109 When implemented together, bankruptcy became 
unavailable to the defaulting borrower without the affirmative consent 
of the mortgagee’s designee on the borrower’s board of directors.110 The 
appointed director for each debtor corporation or corporate general 
partner was a former attorney who had worked for an affiliate of the 
lender and whose director compensation after default was paid by the 
lender.111 
Upon default of the mortgages underlying the securitization 
interest, the trustee, on behalf of the investors, began to foreclose on the 
                                                                                                                                         
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra Parts I.A, I.B. 
 105. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006); Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52. 
 106. Id. 
 107. In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 108. Id. at 738. 
 109. Id. at 716. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 716-17. 
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mortgages.112 In response to the foreclosures on the debtors’ underlying 
assets, the SPE, in an effort to circumvent an independent manager’s 
refusal to authorize a bankruptcy filing, allegedly recruited creditors to 
file an involuntary petition against itself.113 Although the bylaws for 
each debtor required the unanimous consent of the board of directors in 
order to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition, this structure was evaded 
by solicitation of the debtors’ creditors who invoked the involuntary 
petition.114 
The debtors’ lenders moved to dismiss the case pursuant to section 
1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which, among other things, requires 
that insolvency petitions not be filed in bad faith.115 Even though the 
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly require that a Chapter 11 petition 
be filed in good faith, many courts have developed a “bad faith” 
standard where the bankruptcy court may dismiss a petition at the 
inception of the case.116 The lenders argued that the SPE’s alleged 
recruitment of and collusion with the petitioning creditors constituted 
bad faith warranting dismissal of the petition. Observing that the Second 
Circuit requires an additional finding of “objective futility” in using the 
reorganization process, the court denied the motion to dismiss.117 Judge 
Brozmon concluded that the unsecured creditors’ “reasonable belief that 
they could reorganize” suggested “they were not acting in bad faith” in 
filing the petition.118 The court agreed that the debtors’ collusion with 
petitioning creditors was “suggestive of bad faith” but found that the 
debtors’ primary motive was to preserve the value of the debtors’ estate 
for their creditors.119 
As an additional matter, while the involuntary petition was 
orchestrated in contravention of the spirit of agreement between the 
secured investors and the general partner, the court concluded that the 
filing was justified by gross malfeasance by the board in fulfilling its 
fiduciary obligations to the company’s stakeholders.120 Specifically, the 
court addressed the lender’s designated director’s lack of independence 
                                                                                                                                         
 112. Id. at 717. 
 113. Id. at 719-23. 
 114. Id. at 737. 
 115. Id. at 724-25. 
 116. Id. at 724. 
 117. Id. at 725. 
 118. Id. at 734. 
 119. Id. at 734-36. 
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2012] THE FUTURE OF THE SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITY 245 
as one of the mitigating factors against dismissal. The court noted that 
the director failed to take any action or to inform himself about what 
was happening after he learned of the commencement of foreclosure.121 
This inaction was characterized by the court as a breach of fiduciary 
duty to the stakeholders, as well as to general creditors of the insolvent 
debtor.122 Further, a breach of fiduciary duty, if attributed to the lender, 
could give rise to an affirmative claim for damages. 
Kingston Square can be read narrowly to conclude that an 
independent director must be truly independent or read broadly to hold 
that corporate formalities can be overlooked if there is a reasonable 
opportunity to reorganize.123 The case raises issues of whether directors 
owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders of a SPE, unsecured trade creditors 
and professionals, or bondholders/investors, but it does not decide how 
these conflicts should be addressed.124 Nonetheless, it is arguable that 
the bankruptcy remote provisions of a SPE should be enforced to 
prevent voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy orchestrated by a transferor 
as the transferor has obtained the benefit of the securitization with full 
knowledge of the bankruptcy remote provisions.125 
B. BANKRUPTCY REMOTE PROVISIONS FAILURE TO PROTECT 
AGAINST A VOLUNTARY PETITION 
As seen in Kingston Square, while bankruptcy remote provisions in 
the SPE structure may reduce Borrower Bankruptcy Risk, they do not 
eliminate such risk entirely. A subsequent case, General Growth 
Properties, Inc., (“GGP”), illustrates how bankruptcy remote provisions 
can fail to protect an SPE from a voluntary bankruptcy filing.126 In GGP, 
the Southern District of New York held that the Chapter 11 filings of 
certain SPEs were not bad faith and that the SPEs were eligible for 
                                                                                                                                         
 121. Id. at 736. 
 122. Madison et al., supra note 16, § 13:38 (citing In re Kingston Square Assocs., 
214 B.R. at 736). 
 123. Sheryl A. Gussett, A Not-So-Independent Director in a Bankruptcy Remote 
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 124. Dunaway, supra note 6, § 56:52 (citing Robert Dean Ellis, Securitization 
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bankruptcy despite being set up as bankruptcy remote. In GGP, secured 
lenders (the “Lenders”) filed motions to dismiss against five subsidiaries 
of GGP that were included in GGP’s Chapter 11 filing.127 GGP was a 
publically traded real estate investment trust and the ultimate parent of 
750 wholly owned debtor and non-debtor subsidiaries, joint ventures 
and affiliates.128 GGP’s group portfolio primarily consists of more than 
200 shopping centers in 44 states across the country. 129 GGP had $18.27 
billion in mortgage and debt secured by properties of which $1.83 
billion was the subject of the motions to dismiss.130 GGP had typically 
satisfied its capital needs through mortgage loans from banks and 
insurance companies, and from the commercial mortgage backed 
securities (“CMBS”) market.131 The typical mortgage loan had a three to 
seven year term with a low amortization and a large balloon payment at 
maturity.132 Failure to repay or refinance the debt by the repayment date 
would result in hyper-amortization, meaning a steep interest rate 
increase, a requirement for approval of expenditures by the lender, 
and/or a requirement that the cash be kept at the project level with any 
excess applied to the principal of the mortgage.133 GGP generally 
refinanced debts before the repayment date to avoid the possibility of 
hyper-amortization.134 
By the end of 2008, as the credit crisis hit and the CMBS market 
became increasingly volatile, GGP was unable to refinance its maturing 
debt.135 Nor could GGP sell any of its assets in an attempt to pay down 
the debt, largely because potential purchasers were also having trouble 
finding the necessary financing.136 Due to this financial hardship, GGP 
began using its operating cash flow to pay its regular expenses, leaving 
GGP unable to meet prior financial obligations.137 Many of GGP’s loans 
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went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were commenced relating 
to some of the defaulting loans.138 
GGP filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on April 16, 2009.139 GGP had set up several SPEs as 
part of its corporate structure, and these entities, (the “Subject Debtors”) 
were included in its bankruptcy filing. Each of the Subject Debtors was 
structured with operating agreements that required the consent of the 
SPE’s independent managers before the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.140 Immediately prior to the bankruptcy filings, GGP had 
replaced two of the independent managers from one SPE.141 The new 
independent managers voted in favor of the bankruptcy filing.142 Despite 
GGP and the Subject Debtors having positive cash flow and positive 
performance as of the date of filing, GGP believed that its capital 
structure had become unmanageable to service the $18.4 billion debt 
due to mature in 2012 because of the collapsing CMBS market.143 
1. Development of the Bad Faith Standard 
The Lenders filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Subject 
Debtors’ petitions should be dismissed as having been filed in bad 
faith.144 Under the equitable doctrine of “bad faith,” a court is authorized 
to dismiss a bankruptcy petition where there is no reasonable likelihood 
that the debtor intends to reorganize and no reasonable probability that it 
would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.145 The GGP 
court relied on the standard set forth in Kingston Square which had held 
that a bankruptcy petition will be dismissed for bad faith if both 
objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith 
in filing the petition are found.146 Under Kingston Square, no one factor 
                                                                                                                                         
 138. Id. 
 139. The case was procedurally consolidated, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 1015(a), meaning that two or more petitions in the same 
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 140. GGP, 409 B.R. at 62. 
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S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
248 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
is determinative of bad faith and the court must base its decision on the 
totality of circumstances of the debtor’s financial condition and 
motives.147 
The GGP court further discussed the evolution of the “bad faith” 
doctrine. It noted that when Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), it 
strengthened provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1112 to dismiss or convert a 
Chapter 11 case, but did not expressly provide a bad faith provision.148 
Congress also amended Bankruptcy Code § 1121(d) to shorten 
bankruptcy cases, omitting a requirement that the court hold a hearing 
on the debtor’s good faith.149 The court reasoned that Congress’ 
omission in requiring a good faith hearing is consistent with the Code’s 
provisions to leave the debtor in possession, and incentivizing the debtor 
to file early in order to preserve the debtor’s estate.150 
The Lenders argued that the Subject Debtors’ bankruptcy cases 
should be dismissed because they prematurely sought bankruptcy 
protection and because the prospect of liability on their debt was 
speculative.151 The prematurity argument was based on the fact that the 
petitions were filed before the balloon payments on many of the SPEs’ 
three to seven year loans had become due, and before the loans were in 
default.152 The Lenders also argued bad faith based on the Subject 
Debtors’ decision to file for relief without attempting to negotiate with 
the Lenders.153 The Lenders claimed that they could veto any plan the 
Subject Debtors proposed, so that no reorganization would be 
possible.154 
The court disagreed with these arguments, explaining that the 
Subject Debtors carry enormous fixed debt that was neither contingent 
nor speculative as it was set to mature at a fixed date.155 Further, the 
Subject Debtors and GGP were in financial distress at the time of the 
filing.156 Four of the Subject Debtors had either cross defaulted to the 
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defaults of other GGP affiliates or would soon be in default.157 
Additionally, one of the loans had gone into hyper-amortization in 2008 
so that interest had increased by 4.26%, with additional mortgage debts 
maturing in 2010, 2011, and 2012 that likely faced the same problem.158 
Further, the Subject Debtors were either guarantors on maturing loans of 
other GGP parties, had property that was collateral for a maturing loan, 
or some loans had a high loan-to-value ratio indicating financial 
distress.159 
The court therefore concluded that it was unnecessary to require the 
Subject Debtors to wait for the principal debt payments to become due 
before filing for Chapter 11 protection.160 Further, the Bankruptcy Code 
does not require that a debtor be insolvent prior to filing bankruptcy, and 
therefore a solvency analysis was not required in determining whether 
GGP acted in good faith.161 
2. Failure to Negotiate/Replacing Independent Directors Not Bad 
Faith 
The Lenders further argued that the Subject Debtors had acted in 
bad faith because they failed to negotiate prior to filing the petition, and 
because the independent directors had been fired and replaced weeks 
before the bankruptcy petition without notice to the Lenders.162 The 
court dismissed this argument on two grounds. First, the Bankruptcy 
Code does not require borrowers to negotiate with their lenders before 
filing a bankruptcy petition.163 Second, there was no indication that the 
Lenders would have been able or willing to refinance or modify the 
Subject Debtors’ loans.164 Further, the Subject Debtors presented 
evidence establishing that they could not even get the CMBS lenders to 
speak with them regarding loan modification or refinancing.165 
The court ultimately accepted the Subject Debtors’ decision to 
discharge the original independent directors and replace them prior to 
bankruptcy. Based on Kingston Square, the GGP Court held that the 
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managers’ replacement was insufficient to warrant dismissal based on 
bad faith.166 The GGP Court held that the new independent directors had 
expertise and experience in assessing bankruptcy and restructuring 
issues that might arise.167 GGP offered testimony that the company did 
not disclose the replacement of the independent managers because it 
wanted to avoid unwanted publicity about a potential bankruptcy 
filing.168 Further, the operating agreements did not require them to 
disclose the replacements,.169 As long as the SPE property owner 
appointed a replacement that satisfied the standard of independence set 
forth in the organizational documents, no notice or consent was required 
regarding the secured lenders.170 
The court also identified other ways in which the Lenders were 
protected. Specifically, it pointed to such mechanisms as adequate 
protection, fees and interests if their claims are oversecured, and 
protection against substantive consolidation.171 The Lenders’ 
inconvenience would not justify dismissing a Chapter 11 petition.172 
Therefore, the court concluded that the Subject Debtors did not act in 
bad faith by filing Chapter 11 petitions without negotiating or by 
replacing the independent directors without disclosure.173 This reasoning 
suggests that even improper replacement of independent managers 
might not be cause for dismissal on grounds of bad faith.174 
3. Corporate Family Doctrine 
The Lenders also argued that the bankruptcy remote SPE structure 
required that each Subject Debtor’s financial distress be analyzed 
exclusively, and that the court should only consider the financial 
condition of each Subject Debtor independently rather than the entire 
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condition of the GGP entity.175 The court acknowledged that the SPE 
structure was unquestionably intended to insulate the financial position 
of each Subject Debtor and to make the prospect of default less likely.176 
However, the Subject Debtors had balloon payments due to the Lenders 
that would require refinancing in the near future. If the Subject Debtors 
were not able to obtain financing and if GGP, the parent entity, did not 
come to the SPEs’ rescue, the loans would soon be in default.177 The 
court explained that the Lenders had to be aware they were lending to a 
company that was part of a larger corporate group, as this was 
admittedly part of the reason they chose to extend the loans to the 
Subject Debtors.178 Further, lending to a part of a corporate group 
entailed both the benefits and detriments of this structure.179 If the ability 
of the group to obtain financing became impaired, the financial situation 
of the subsidiary would inevitably be impaired. 
The few cases on point supported GGP’s position that the interest 
of the entire group or company should be considered rather than only 
that of the individual debtors.180 The court applied Heisley v. U.I.P. 
Engineered Product Corp. (In re U.I.P.), a case involving the 
bankruptcy of a steel company with multiple subsidiaries. In Heisley, the 
court addressed several debtors’ cases together because “the nature of a 
corporate family create[s] an ‘identity of interest’ . . . that justifies the 
protection of the subsidiaries as well as the parent corporation.”181 
Heisley supports the principle that the corporate family doctrine should 
apply when the parts are worth far less than the whole, or when the unity 
of interest protects not just the entities, but the underlying asset value.182 
Adopting the reasoning set forth in Heisley, GGP held that “financial 
distress” for each GGP entity did not have to be determined separately. 
The court found that GGP functioned as an integrated operation and that 
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the nature of its corporate structure created an identity of interest that 
justified the protection of the subsidiaries, as well as the parent 
corporation.183 
The court accepted GGP’s argument that it had to reorganize its 
capital structure due to the collapsed CMBS market and its inability to 
refinance.184 The Lenders did not explain how billions of dollars in 
unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured if the cash flow 
of the parent continued to be based on the earnings of the subsidiaries 
that had debt due in the coming year that they would be unable to repay 
or refinance.185 The court would not adopt the Lenders’ argument that 
the interests of the subsidiaries and their creditors should be secondary 
to those of the parent and its creditors.186 The court was required to take 
account of the interests of both the parent company and subsidiaries.187 
Further, the GGP board considered each subsidiary individually in 
determining whether it should file its own Chapter 11 petition.188 
Therefore, because GGP’s filing was found to be proper, the filings of 
the Subject Debtors were also justified and necessary to the 
reorganization of GGP. 
4. The Fiduciary Duties of the Independent Directors 
In examining the relative operating agreements, the court noted the 
duties expressly enumerated to the independent managers. The operating 
agreements provided that the managers (i) were only to consider the 
interests of the company, including the company creditors; (ii) that the 
unanimous written consent of the managers was required before filling a 
bankruptcy petition; and (iii) that the managers had a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty and care similar to those of the General Corporation Law of the 
State of Delaware.189 Delaware corporate law provides that directors 
must consider the interests of shareholders as long as the debtor is 
solvent.190 The court found that the provision requiring the independent 
director to consider the interests of the company and its creditors 
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conflicted with the provision stating the independent director could only 
act in accordance with Delaware corporate law.191 
The court held that pursuant to Delaware law and the relative 
operating agreements, the duty of the independent directors was not to 
prevent the SPEs from filing a bankruptcy petition.192 Instead, the 
independent directors had the same duties as non-independent directors 
of a Delaware corporation, which is a prima facie duty to act in the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, not just the secured 
lender.193 
The court relied on North American Catholic Educational 
Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, which rejected the 
proposition that directors of a Delaware corporation owed a duty to 
creditors when operating in the zone of insolvency.194 In Gheewalla, the 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected a controversial line of Chancery 
Court holdings that had expanded directors’ fiduciary obligations to 
include the company’s creditors, not just when the company is insolvent 
but any time the company is operating in the “zone of insolvency.” 
Based on Gheewalla, the GGP court concluded that an independent 
manager of a solvent subsidiary must consider the interests of the parent 
company above the creditors in deciding whether to authorize a 
bankruptcy filing.195 The court explained that the Lenders were simply 
mistaken if they believed the SPEs’ independent managers were 
obligated only to protect the secured lenders’ interests.196 
 
IV. GGP AFTERMATH 
A. DOES GGP MEAN MORE SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION? 
As discussed earlier, SPEs are primarily intended to mitigate the 
risk of substantive consolidation.197 Commentators have expressed 
growing concern that the GGP decision will make it easier for 
bankruptcy remote entities to file for bankruptcy and increase pressure 
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on lenders to agree to the use of their cash collateral.198 The concern is 
that permitting a parent company to use cash collateral of its SPE’s 
lenders will make the lenders less secure and substantive consolidation 
more probable.199 However, a narrow interpretation of GGP will be 
unlikely to promote substantive consolidation. The GGP court explained 
that “the question of substantive consolidation is entirely different” and 
“[n]othing . . . implies that the assets and liabilities of any of the Subject 
Debtors could properly be substantively consolidated with those of any 
other entity.”200 This reasoning suggests that the court applied a 
“corporate family” doctrine treating affiliated companies as a collective 
whole engaged in a common enterprise.201 The court did not collapse the 
interests of the parent and the subsidiary, as would be the case in 
substantive consolidation, but did view the corporate problems as 
affecting the entity as a whole.202 
Rather than promoting substantive consolidation, GGP’s 
application of the corporate family doctrine illustrates how SPE 
borrowers, as part of a larger corporate bankruptcy, should be viewed as 
part of the corporate family in the bankruptcy process. This is 
particularly instructive in the “bad faith” context. In GGP, the court 
explained how the credit crisis and current economy have affected 
lending practices among SPEs.203 This economic climate created a need 
for the court to consider the interests of the corporate family as a 
whole.204 The court explained that: 
Faced with the unprecedented collapse of the real estate markets, and 
serious uncertainty as to when or if they would be able to refinance 
the . . . debt, the Debtors’ management had to reorganize the Group’s 
capital structure. [Secured lenders] do not explain how the billions of 
dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured 
responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be 
based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a 
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period of years without any known means of providing for 
repayment or refinance.205 
Thus, the state of the market is itself a crucial factor warranting a 
balancing of the secured creditors’ expectation of the SPE’s durability, 
versus the parent and SPE borrowers’ expectations that a refinancing 
market would exist.206 
B. IF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS CAN BE REPLACED ON THE EVE OF 
BANKRUPTCY, ARE THESE PROVISIONS STILL EFFECTIVE? 
GGP has also led many market participants to question the 
effectiveness of independent director provisions, based on the fact that 
in GGP, independent directors were replaced on the eve of the SPEs’ 
bankruptcy filing.207 However, the court pointed out that the replacement 
directors satisfied the Lender’s explicit requirements for 
independence.208 While the independent directors have a duty to the 
creditors when the SPE is insolvent, the vast majority of SPE debtors are 
solvent, meaning this duty runs in favor of equity.209 Going forward, 
lenders will be likely to enhance independent director requirements by 
ensuring that they receive notice and the opportunity to verify 
compliance prior to any director’s removal or replacement.210 However, 
too much lender control can lead to additional unwanted lender liability, 
as a lender’s excessive control over a borrower’s business can lead to 
the lender being liable for the borrower’s debt.211 
According to the reasoning set forth in GGP, a subsidiary cannot 
contract around the independent directors’ duties to the parent company 
while the subsidiary is solvent. Therefore, creditors of a solvent 
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subsidiary cannot avoid limited fiduciary protection. In GGP, the 
Lenders had gone to great lengths to attempt to prevent the Subject 
Debtors from incurring debt other than to their respective lenders.212 
According to the debt-restricting provisions, except when due to 
diminution in the value of collateral, a GGP SPE should never be 
insolvent if it were to comply with the provisions that prohibit it from 
incurring other debt.213 By contrast, independent directors of an 
insolvent SPE owe a fiduciary duty to the SPE’s creditors, but directors 
of a solvent SPE only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its 
shareholders.214 Therefore, the only time an independent director can 
consider the lender’s interests is in the rare case where the SPE is 
insolvent.215 
In GGP, fiduciary requirements proved to be an ineffective source 
of lender protection when the independent directors of a solvent SPE 
owed a fiduciary duty to the equity holders. These equity holders were 
the insolvent GGP parent entity who benefitted from the SPEs’ inclusion 
in the bankruptcy process. Because lenders only receive fiduciary 
protection when the SPE itself is insolvent, and because application of 
the corporate family doctrine in bankruptcy focuses on the interests of 
the corporate group as a whole, the parent entity’s interests will almost 
always be considered before those of the lender. This fiduciary 
limitation may cause lenders to refrain from using the independent 
director requirement because its application can seriously negate its 
advantages to lenders. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite recent attacks, SPEs remain a valuable method of 
securitization. SPEs can still effectively be bankruptcy remote as long as 
proper procedural precautions are followed. Based on GGP, a 
borrower’s operating agreement should require independent directors to 
consider only the interests of the borrower and its creditors when 
considering bankruptcy filings.216 While this kind of limitation may only 
be effective while the SPE is insolvent, it will preserve separateness, as 
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well as increase lenders’ fiduciary protection in the zone of insolvency. 
The operating agreement should eliminate any fiduciary duty to 
members and other affiliates, as permitted under applicable corporate 
law.217 
Further, the SPE should have corporate governance provisions 
which ensure that the SPE is abiding by corporate formalities, such as 
(1) maintaining books and records separate from any other related 
corporate entities; (2) maintaining separate accounts; (3) making sure 
there is no commingling of assets between related corporate entities; (4) 
conducting business under the SPE’s name as opposed to that of any 
other related entity; (5) maintaining separate financial statements; (6) 
paying liabilities out of the SPE’s own funds; (7) maintaining an arm’s 
length relationship with affiliates; (8) paying its salaries for its own 
employees; (9) not guaranteeing debt of any other entity; (10) not 
pledging assets for the benefit of any other entity; (11) not acquiring 
obligations or securities of any of its partners; (12) maintaining adequate 
capital; and (13) reasonably allocating and sharing overhead costs for 
shared office space.218 Even small measures such as using independent 
stationary, invoices, and checks can help ensure that the entity’s 
separateness will be upheld.219 The transferor and lender should monitor 
these provisions in order to help preserve the SPE’s legal structure for 
both parties’ advantage. 
The creditworthiness of the parent will also play a critical role in 
obtaining SPE financing. Despite its separateness, the financial state of 
the parent entity inherently affects the financial state of the SPE. 
Because of this, lenders are likely to require more underwriting due 
diligence.220 Excessive leverage at the parent level or maturity 
concentrations among affiliated borrowers might render the parent 
susceptible to a failing economy where refinancing is not available.221 
The GGP opinion is likely to draw focus to this risk, which could impact 
the pricing of subsidiary debt. The more the SPE relies on and is 
intertwined with the parent entity and its affiliates, the more likely it is 
that financial distress at the parent level will trickle down. 
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Lenders can also take action to protect themselves in bankruptcy 
remote structuring. To ensure the effectiveness of the independent 
director requirement, lenders may require notice prior to the replacement 
of the borrower’s independent managers.222 This would increase scrutiny 
on any independent director replacements, and may prevent replacement 
from occurring solely to the lender’s disadvantage. If possible, the 
independent managers should have experience in real estate finance and 
insolvency. 
Lenders should also consider the advantage of structuring 
independent director provisions to ensure that the directors are truly 
independent of both the lender and the borrower’s existing principals.223 
A director that has been designated by the lender, who acts as a mere 
puppet of the lender, runs the risk of breaching fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and to third party creditors, and a truly independent director 
would mitigate this risk.224 A truly independent director could strictly 
abide by his or her corporate fiduciary duties and prevent against the 
risk of lender liability due to excessive control. While in the short run 
this may appear less favorable to the lender as the lender may not be 
able to rely on the director to favor its interests; independence will 
lessen the risk that the SPE will make a bad faith decision regarding a 
distressed loan.225 
Even if the independent director requirements prove to be 
ineffective, there are other protective mechanisms available to lenders 
that can help protect their interest in the collateral. As long as the 
borrower’s assets and liabilities remain strictly separate from those of 
the borrower’s affiliates, the goals of bankruptcy remote provisions can 
still be served. The transfer of assets should be carefully structured as a 
true sale, giving the SPE limited recourse against the transferor for the 
asset purchase price.226 Structuring the transfer as a true sale will ensure 
that the SPE has maximum protection against any financial distress of 
the transferor, and therefore incentivize lending. 
Additionally, newly enacted legislation will improve the quality of 
lending practices, which will ultimately further protect lenders. Section 
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941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires that 
lenders now retain a small ownership percentage in the loans they 
originate.227 In the past, lenders could sell an entire loan almost 
immediately after issuing it, which created a lack of accountability in 
issuing the loan and its quality.228 By requiring partial-ownership, the 
Dodd-Frank Act gives lenders a business incentive to check the quality 
of the asset and make sure it is capable of supporting the loan.229 
The immediate effect of this legislation may be to slow recovery of 
the CMBS market because of uncertainty as to the requirements, 
increased compliance costs, and because money will not be freed up as 
quickly.230 However, in the long run, this added incentive will improve 
investor confidence and ultimately provide a more efficient lending 
market.231 
Despite GGP, precautionary structuring and new restrictive 
legislation, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, will encourage commercial 
lending through bankruptcy remote SPEs. GGP illustrates the effect of a 
credit crisis on lending practices and bankruptcy law. The risk of a SPE 
being negatively affected by the financial trouble of related corporate 
entities cannot be completely avoided.232 
The surprising result in GGP was necessary given the undeniable 
financial distress of the parent entity and the court appropriately focused 
on recovery of the corporate group as a whole. It would be unrealistic to 
argue that a corporate parent’s financial distress would not affect its 
subsidiary, no matter how separate or remote. Further, recovery of the 
corporate group may require a restructuring of all its parts. 
Additionally, legislative reform will promote accountability in 
lending practices and deter the type of irresponsible lending that largely 
contributed to the credit crisis. Therefore, modern concerns need not 
diminish the effectiveness of bankruptcy remote provisions. Instead, 
GGP emphasizes practical reorganizational challenges that large 
corporate entities may face when trying to restructure in a damaged 
economy, and how SPE securitization is not immune from these 
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challenges. GGP serves as a valuable tool for understanding how to 
carefully construct restrictive corporate governance provisions in order 
to provide greater lender protection when faced with an uncertain 
economy. 
